As the lecture progressed McCormack addressed two more areas: 3) a return to the challenging issue of violence in atonement theory, including where the criticisms do and do not stick; and 4) the ethical component of man and woman's "being in correspondence" with Jesus Christ, the true human.
If you've been following along these past weeks you may remember that McCormack first addressed the challenges from contemporary theologians including J. Denny Weaver over the violence of the traditional doctrine of the atonement back in Lecture 1. According to this challenge the traditional model of penal substitution indicates that violence is inherent to the doctrine of the atonement, the Christian faith, and even God Himself. Much of this critique is easy to answer when we consider that God is the subject who is at work on the cross - that the Son and the Father are not acting at cross purposes, that the Father is not inherently wrathful towards us, that God's wrath and God's mercy are not to be played off against one another.
But the tradition has some difficulty make this case with consistency, precisely because of its failure to achieve the integration of the person and the work of Christ. The tradition, for example, has been unable to entertain the idea of Jesus' death in God-abandonment, i.e. that the cry of dereliction (Mark 15:34) indicates that God the Father has actually withdrawn His sustaining presence from the Son and allowed Him to die a death that is separation from God in a real sense (that is, death as we would experience it under the conditions of our sin). Because of the ancient commitment to the doctrine of divine impassibility, it has also hesitated to speak of death as an experience proper to God Himself.
What McCormack's new, Barthian take on kenoticism as the eternal humility and obedience of the Son of God does here is to introduce the possibility that humanity - including suffering and death - may be properly predicated of God in His second mode of being. This is not a function of weakness but of power: the decision of God's eternal election is a decision to be powerless. This is His sovereign determination. And so God in His first mode of being (as Father) differs from God in His second mode of being (as Son) as majesty differs from humility.
There is no talk here of a "death of God," McCormack says, but rather of death in God. This is an important point, and readers of Barth will recognize this refrain from Volume IV/1 of the Church Dogmatics. On the cross God does not send His Son only to die a human death, to excoriate and terminate the life of his flesh; but rather God here takes death into God's own life. He "drinks it to the dregs," experiencing death in its full horror and cruelty. Yet God is not overcome by this experience, but rather it becomes the death of Death.
What of the charge of violence, then? A well-ordered doctrine of the atonement makes it clear that it is not the violence in the event of Christ's death that has saving value. Nor is it the suffering of Christ in the flesh that saves us. For McCormack, the saving value is that Jesus' death is a death in God-abandonment, that it is an endurance of the full penalty for sin - separation from God and the end of God's creative sustaining of our creaturely existence. Note that penal language still has a place here: Christ is dealing with the just consequences of our sin. God has handed over Himself to those consequences, and so done away with them. But violence has at most a didactic value: it depicts the triumphant end of the spiritual oppression that enslaves us.
And so some of Weaver's criticisms do stick. He is right, McCormack suggests, to criticize the tradition for suggesting a transaction that takes place between the Father and the Son, a transaction which might as well take place outside of history, and which has no ethical component.
That ethical component is where McCormack chooses to finish his lecture series. Jesus Christ introduces us to our own true humanity, and our "being in correspondence" with Christ makes possible our own realization of true humanity. We are not transformed by means of a sort of "divine surgery" - no infused habit is added on to us, no substantially construed sin nature is ontologically healed. Instead, the change in us is affected by an existential encounter with God in the Holy Spirit. In an actualist metaphysic human beings are what we do; conformity to Christ, therefore, is itself ontological! As we find ourselves in relation to God through Jesus Christ, the true human, we see what is simply the "eschatological signpost" of what we will be when we see our Savior face-to-face.
Our part to play in this orientation to God is nothing more than surrender, McCormack says. This primary activity is possible through the gift of faith, and in turn it enables our renunciation of the human in favor of the divine. It becomes stirringly clear here that an ontology of being in act is an ontology that is inherently oriented to ethics. And that is a great strength.
Thank you for following along as I've done my best to draw out some important themes of the 2011 Croall Lectures. It was very rewarding to attend them and to engage Professor McCormack in conversation over the course of two weeks, and I hope that I've managed to do justice here to what he said. My thanks to him for the experience. I'll say again that I have not tried to summarize any of the lectures in full, so if you'd like to fully engage the material do be on the lookout for the book when it is published in the next year or two (I hope). That will also include several sections, and at least one full chapter, that didn't make it into the lectures. (You'll also discover some of McCormack's more provocative moves that I've deliberately avoided going into here.)
I hope to follow up and conclude this series of posts with some final reflections of my own on the significance of McCormack's new typology for the doctrine of the atonement, and which elements are for me, several weeks later, still itches that demand to be scratched. In the meantime, any questions or comments you have to post would be most welcome.
Croall Lectures: Series Index
Lecture 1: The 'Perils' of Penal Substitution
Lecture 2: The Incarnation As Saving Event
Lecture 2.1: T.F. Torrance and the Atonement
Lecture 3: 'Let Justice and Peace Reign'
Lecture 4: 'After Metaphysics'
Lecture 5: The Cry of Dereliction in Scripture
Lecture 6: The Humility of the Son (Part 1)
Lecture 6: 'The Lord of Glory Was Crucified' (Part 2)


Hey darren, i'm a bit confused by the point about Weaver's critiques. You way "He is right, McCormack suggests, to criticize the tradition for suggesting a transaction that takes place between the Father and the Son, a transaction which might as well take place outside of history, and which has no ethical component." Can you elaborate the relevance of that a bit?
ReplyDeleteGeordie, I think that the suggestion here is that, on the traditional account the Son performs an act which propitiates the Father's wrath, or pays a debt, or satisfies His honor, or what have you (in the variety of atonement metaphors). In each case (and perhaps, one might argue, all the more keenly in penal substitution), what takes place on the cross is thought to be a transaction between two persons of the Godhead. Why should it take place in an incarnation? Why on earth? Why in A.D. 33 (or 29, however you date it)? The Father and the Son have reached this 'agreement,' and it is predetermined from the foundation of the world -- so what happens on the cross is perhaps little more than theater (or "going through the motions").
ReplyDeleteMoral models of the atonement instead stress one or both of: a) Jesus' life of example for us; and b) Jesus' work as ontologically transformative for us (and not just a change of forensic status). I think you can get ethics out of the former models, but it is more evident how ethics flows from this sort. If God is simply enacting or historicizing a decision about our forensic state, then are the cross, the life of Jesus, my repentance and faith, etc. all that significant?